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The objective of this article is to improve our 
understanding of preferences in experienced-based 
choice. Positioned within the framework of naturalistic 
decision making, this article responds to the recent call to 
complement the examination of experience-based choice 
with studies of cognition in the “wild.” We document 
an exploratory field study that uses applied cognitive 
task analysis (ACTA) to examine financial day traders’ 
preferences. Providing real-world examples, our study 
illustrates how day traders construct their understanding 
of gains relative to losses and emphasizes the relevance 
of prospect theory for understanding the asymmetry 
of human choice. The fourfold pattern of preferences as 
studied in the wild is risk seeking for medium- and high-
probability gains, risk averse for small-probability gains, 
risk averse for small-probability losses, and risk averse for 
medium- and high-probability losses. Our results differ 
from the fourfold pattern of preferences exhibited by 
experience-based choice when studied in the laboratory. 
The implications of this work for prospect theory and 
the distinction between “experience through learning” 
and “experience through professional training” are 
discussed alongside the merits of the ACTA technique for 
professional expert domain-based knowledge elicitation.
Keywords: naturalistic decision making, experience-
based choice, preference, applied cognitive task analysis, 
day trading
IntroductIon
Modern decision science is undergoing a pro-
cess of reframing. Although decision research was 
once split by distinct preferences for what it ought 
to be, recognition of the need for a more unified 
and complete understanding of decision making 
has called for an end to these divisions (Dalal et al., 
2010; Gore, Banks, Millward, & Kyriakidou, 
2006; Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Kahneman & Klein, 
2009; McAndrew, Banks & Gore, 2008; McAn-
drew, Gore & Banks, 2009). Examples of what 
some have claimed decision making ought to be 
include a discipline based on normative ideals and 
prescriptive standards, one providing descriptive 
accounts of cognition studied in the “wild,” and 
the study of systematic deviations in the form of 
heuristics and biases. Recent reframing by Kahne-
man and Klein (2009) has focused on the intersec-
tions between naturalistic decision making (NDM) 
and the heuristics and biases approach. Parallel to 
this discussion, Rakow and Newell (2010) recom-
mend the importance of researching a new frame 
of experience-based choice within the wider con-
text of decision research. It is clear to appreciate 
that the conditions for advancement are ripe.
This article draws insights from the field of 
NDM to better understand decision makers’ 
preferences as investigated within the paradigm 
of experience-based choice. We open with an 
examination of recent findings relating to expe-
rience-based choice. Noting the call to comple-
ment this with studies of “cognition in the 
wild,” the authors highlight the important con-
tributions of the NDM community. We then 
outline an exploratory field study that advances 
our understanding of preferences in experience-
based choice in the wild. We conclude by con-
sidering the implications of our findings for 
future research within the decision sciences.
Experience-Based choice
Experience-based choice has rapidly become 
a feature of decision science research. Recent 
research has found decision makers’ prefer-
ences to consistently differ depending on the 
format of choice presented. This has been 
marked by studies documenting the observation 
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of systematic differences between decisions 
based on description and those based on experi-
ence (Camilleri & Newell, 2009b; Hertwig & 
Erev, 2009; Newell & Rakow, 2007; Rakow & 
Newell, 2010).
The first, decision from description, is a for-
mat whereby every possible outcome and deci-
sion is specified at the outset (Hertwig & Ples-
kac, 2008). Consider, for example, a game 
whereby you are asked to choose between (a) a 
90% chance of winning $0 and a 10% chance of 
winning $10 or (b) a guaranteed $1. People tend 
to attribute more weight to small-probability 
events than objectively warranted and so prefer 
(a), the gamble. That is, people are risk seeking 
for small-probability gains and high-probability 
losses (people tend to prefer a 10% chance of 
$10 to $1 for sure) and risk averse for high-
probability gains and small-probability losses 
(most people prefer $9 for sure to a 99% chance 
of $10). Decisions emerge consistent with pros-
pect theory’s fourfold pattern of choice: Partici-
pants are risk averse for high-probability gains, 
risk seeking for high-probability losses, risk 
averse for small-probability losses, and risk 
seeking for small-probability gains (see Table 1).
The second format of choice, decision from 
experience, is defined as one whereby personal 
observation and feedback from the environment 
guide the outcomes generated and assessments 
of their relative probabilities. When people are 
presented with the task in this format, prefer-
ences for small-probability gains and losses tend 
to be the converse, with people displaying a 
preference for the sure thing (b) (Barron & Erev, 
2003; Erev et al., 2009; Hau, Pleskac, & 
Hertwig, 2009; Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 
2008; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; 
see Table 1). Risk aversion for a gain is attribut-
able to underweighting of the rare event. Exami-
nation of preferences for high-probability gains 
and losses for decisions from experience has 
been more limited, although speculation has sug-
gested that there is little difference when com-
pared to preferences in the condition of descrip-
tion (Rakow & Newell, 2010).
Explanations for the differences between 
these formats of choice have included sampling 
bias (one is more likely to undersample than 
oversample experiences of rare events), recency 
effects (giving more weight to observations 
experienced most recently; although note Bar-
ron and Yechiam’s [2009] findings that call into 
question the notion of recency effects with rare 
events), and the phenomenon of representation 
(an encoding distortion of the outcome distribu-
tion prior to choice; Camilleri & Newell, 2009b; 
Hertwig & Erev, 2009). Commenting on these 
findings, Hertwig and Erev (2009) note the 
results are to be viewed not as contradictory but 
as an illustration of how the mind operates in 
two different informational environments:
In other words, one should not play off 
research on description-based and experi-
ence-based behavior—their contrast is 
enlightening. However, to better under-
stand how people make decisions with 
incomplete and uncertain information “in 
the wild”, there is a need to study experi-
ential choices that are often representative 
of people’s actual choices. (p. 522)
TABlE 1: The Fourfold Pattern for Decisions From Description and Experience
Description Experience
Probability Gains Losses Gains Losses
Small probabilities Risk seeking Risk aversion Risk aversion Risk seeking
Medium and large  
 probabilities
Risk aversion Risk seeking Risk aversion? Risk seeking?
Source. Adapted from “Degrees of Uncertainty: An Overview and Framework for Future Research on Experience-
Based Choice,” by T. Rakow and B. R. Newell, 2010, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23(1), p. 3. Copyright 
2009 by Wiley (www.interscience.wiley.com). Adapted with permission.
Note. Speculation is indicated by the presence of question marks.
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Rakow and Newell (2010) echo this call for a 
framework that places experience-based choice 
within the wider context of decision research, 
suggesting that rather than asking what happens 
in experience-based choice and what happens in 
described choice, one may do better to ask what 
is the role of experience and what part does the 
description play? They suggest this approach is 
imperative to understanding properties of the 
external choice environment, types of learning 
experience, types of choice, and properties of 
the internal representation of payoffs (see 
Rakow & Newell, 2010, for a comprehensive 
review of future directions). It is through such 
an examination that we position this article in 
the hope that this exchange is constructive to 
both communities and researchers working in 
the field and the laboratory.
cognition in the Wild
Originating as a critique of disembodied 
views of cognition resulting from study within 
the artificial setting of the laboratory, the con-
cept “cognition in the wild” was coined by 
Hutchins (1995a). By locating cognition in 
context and by focusing on the interactions 
between multiple agents and material artifacts, 
the study of cognition in the wild would give 
rise to the situated and socially constituted 
aspects of cognitive activity.
A new perspective for cognitive science 
guided by anthropology and cognitive theory, 
decision making has been studied in complex 
settings, such a shipboard navigation (Hutchins, 
1995a), aviation (Hutchins, 1995b, 2000; 
Hutchins & Klausen, 2000) and steam plant 
operations (Halff, Hollan, & Hutchins, 1986). 
Although the central thesis of Hutchins’ work 
highlighted the necessity to complement exper-
imental investigations with experiential studies 
of cognition, it is important to observe that this 
perspective emerged in parallel to NDM, a per-
spective that arguably combines quasi-experi-
mentalism and ethnography to study cognition 
in the wild, to which we now turn.
ndM
To some decision research communities, 
NDM is a relatively nascent research area 
(Hodgkinson & Starbuck, 2008) focusing on 
the study of cognition in real-world environ-
ments marked by ill-structured problems; 
uncertain, dynamic environments; shifting, ill-
defined, or competing goals; action-feedback 
loops; time stress; high stakes; multiple players; 
and organizational goals and norms (Orasanu & 
Connolly, 1993). Regarded as “the way people 
use their experience to make decisions in field 
settings” (Zsambok, 1997, p. 4), NDM has been 
received as a complementary mode of inquiry 
to the more classic behavioral decision-making 
paradigm and research associated with heuris-
tics and biases (Connolly & Koput, 1996; Gon-
zalez, 2001; Kerstholt & Ayton, 2001; LeBoeuf 
& Shafir, 2001; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). As 
Gore et al. (2006) noted, the NDM movement 
involves the close examination of heuristics and 
the study of expertise to learn about more pow-
erful domain specific heuristics. NDM research-
ers look for what people do right rather than 
what they do wrong, which is the traditional 
form of inquiry inspired by Kahneman and col-
leagues (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
In other words, much of behavioral decision 
making and heuristics and biases research has 
looked at errors in cognition focusing on judg-
ments for which participants have very little if 
any expertise (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). NDM’s focus on 
the positive features of expert cognition is posi-
tioned in response to the inappropriateness of 
generalizing insights from the study of novices 
to experts in more realistic settings. Lipshitz, 
Klein, Orasanu, and Salas’s (2001) focus article 
“Taking Stock of Naturalistic Decision Mak-
ing” provides a good insight into the field and 
documents the boundaries of the framework. 
For more recent discussions of the intersections 
and differences between NDM and the heuris-
tics and biases approach, see Kahneman and 
Klein’s (2009) article “Conditions for Intuitive 
Expertise: A Failure to Disagree.”
As outlined in Kahneman and Klein (2009), 
NDM research emphasizes two skills: the abil-
ity to recognize patterns of previously experi-
enced cues in new situations and the ability to 
notice and extract cues in unrecognized situa-
tions by drawing from past experience and 
building stories (G. Klein, 1997; Lipshitz & 
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Pras, 2005). Recognition-primed decision mak-
ing (G. Klein, 1993, 1997) is one model of how 
cues from sensory stimuli can trigger the prob-
lem-solving process. Accordingly, the NDM 
community has made significant progress in 
examining decision making as an experientially 
driven process through a consolidation of the-
ory and real-world applications (Johnston, 
Driskell, & Salas, 1997; Hoffman, 2006; Mont-
gomery, Lipshitz, & Brehmer, 2005; Mosier & 
Fischer, 2011; Schraagen, Militello, Ormerod, 
& Lipshitz, 2008; Wong & Stanton, 2009).
Despite this progress, the choice in domains 
of application has scarcely deviated from early 
studies of firefighting, military command and 
control, and nursing (Drury & Darling, 2008; G. 
Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989; 
Militello & Lim, 1995). Accordingly, this work 
investigates the relevance of an NDM lens to a 
further field of study: day traders in financial 
markets. This builds on recent discussions exam-
ining the synergies between NDM and organiza-
tional decision making (Gore et al., 2006: Lip-
shitz, Klein, & Carroll, 2006; McAndrew & 
Gore, 2010) and the relevance of Orasanu and 
Connolly’s (1993) typology of eight defining 
characteristics of NDM to this domain.
The uncertain and dynamic environments 
experienced by day traders are epitomized by 
the comparatively fast pace of markets in which 
they work. “Real” decision problems seldom 
present themselves in an entirely complete and 
orderly form. Dealing with ill-structured prob-
lems, day traders expend effort (a) generating 
hypotheses about the situation, (b) developing 
options as appropriate responses, and (c) recog-
nizing that the situation is one permissible of 
choice. Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 
also denote the information environments 
within which traders operate. Although the 
overarching objective is to create profit, the 
natural fluctuation and pattern of markets may 
necessitate changes in trading strategies (i.e., 
trading ranges or jobbing) and positions (i.e., 
long vs. short).
NDM purports that “real” decision environ-
ments are arranged as a series of temporally 
segregated events as opposed to one discrete 
decision at a specific point in time. The use of 
action-feedback loops to rectify early mistakes 
is a characteristic of corrective action that maps 
directly onto the work of day traders. This is 
amplified by a rate of feedback that is almost 
immediate when trading intraday positions. The 
high stakes associated with such transactions 
are also significant because of the uncertainty 
and risk associated with the short-term volatil-
ity of markets, which necessitate instantaneous 
calls of judgment and also bring a significant 
amount of time stress. The financial market as 
a reflection of an underlying psychological sen-
timent felt by market players at any one point in 
time fits with Orasanu and Connolly’s (1993) 
need to appreciate the cognitive activities of 
multiple players. Finally, the suggestion that the 
organization may establish general goals, rules, 
and standard operating procedures is reflected 
in the specification of the size of trading fund 
and stop losses.
In spite of this congruence, researchers have 
not, until now, examined day trading from an 
NDM perspective, favoring instead a behav-
ioral finance lens. Examining the role of experi-
ence in financial markets, behavioral finance 
researchers have displayed a tendency to use 
laboratory settings to compare expert versus 
student performance. See, for instance, Ander-
son and Sunder’s (1995) comparison of labora-
tory market behavior between expert commod-
ity and stock traders and MBA students. Stock 
price forecasting using probabilistic judgments 
of the likelihood of price increases or decreases 
(Staël von Holstein, 1972) is also characteristic 
of this approach although it has had limited suc-
cess. As Mieg (2001) notes, experimental tasks 
of this nature lack the realism necessary for 
informative conclusions, as in practice, market 
prices are judged directly, not in terms of cate-
gorical judgments or probabilities. Research of 
this type also neglects the role of social net-
works and intercorrelated markets as a basis of 
informational leverage.
A growing trend has been the use of social 
psychological approaches, such as personality 
profiling to understand risk propensity (Fenton-
O’Creevy, Nicholson, Sloane, & Willman, 
2005) and the application of concepts such as 
emotion regulation to understand decision-
making behavior and performance (Fenton-
O’Creevy, Soane, Nicholson, & Willman, 
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2011). This work has aided understanding of 
the process by which day traders acquire exper-
tise: anticipation, encounter, adjustment, and 
stabilization. Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2005) 
suggest that the most pertinent episodes shap-
ing trading styles include early experiences of 
loss and gain, emotional experience of the for-
mer, and beliefs about the market that are based 
on cause and effect and decision outcomes. The 
acknowledgement, however, that risk propen-
sity is only one factor in traders’ behavior 
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2005) suggests value 
in an approach that gives credence to context, 
training, and socialization. Mieg (2001), how-
ever, claims that expertise within this domain is 
not experience driven. Denouncing a strong 
form of expertise rooted in individual experi-
ence, Mieg displays a theoretical preference for 
a weak form of expertise that results from the 
use of information technologies. Key to this 
proposition is his suggestion that day traders 
lack insight into the complexity that drives the 
market, a claim refuted in this article.
Using an intrinsically task-focused approach 
that is sensitive to context, we seek both theo-
retical advancement and practical insights for 
training and development within this domain. It 
is also anticipated that improved understanding 
of how attitudes toward risk concerning gains 
and losses deviate from studies of description 
and experience-based choice in the laboratory 
when studied “in the wild” will hold significant 
implications for other domains beyond the 
immediate field of application.
This article opened with the proposition that 
our understanding of experience-based choice 
might be advanced through the study of cogni-
tion in the wild. The logic is such that (a) much 
of prospect theory is based on a description-
based research paradigm in laboratory settings, 
(b) laboratory research based on an experience-
based paradigm suggests effects different from 
those demonstrated by description-based para-
digms, and (c) field research following an 
experience-based paradigm might reveal effects 
that meaningfully differ from both description-
based research and experience-based laboratory 
research. We see promise in the use of NDM as 
a lens to focus on the positive features of expert 
cognition and suggest that researchers have 
much to gain from the use of applied cognitive 
task analysis (ACTA).
MEthod
We adopted a qualitative methodology aimed 
at exploring decision makers’ preferences using 
a ground-up approach. Framed by NDM, this 
examination of cognition in the wild was con-
ducted in a number of day-trading firms within 
the U.K. finance industry (McAndrew, 2008).
Participants
In-depth interviews were conducted with 8 
day traders (8 male; mean age = 34.8 years, 
SD = 5.50). This exceeded Militello and Hut-
ton’s (1998) recommendation that three to five 
subject matter experts usually exhaust the 
domain of analysis. Participants were recruited 
from four U.K. trading firms: one bank (n = 1), 
two energy providers (n = 4), and one broker-
age firm (n = 3). These firms had divisions that 
traded with a proprietary element, trading for a 
direct profit from the market rather than earning 
commission from processing trades.
All participating firms were authorized and 
regulated by the Financial Services Authority. 
Participants had worked in the industry for an 
average of 10.9 years (SD = 4.22) and had 
acquired an average of 4.8 years (SD = 2.97) of 
experience within their current position. Day 
traders interviewed occupied positions ranging 
from director of trading to more entry-level 
positions. This range of positions does not, how-
ever, indicate novice capabilities. The one junior 
trader included in this sample started trading 3 
years earlier from a fund of €100,000 and pro-
vided recent examples of trades that spoke of 
stop losses in the region of $13,000, implying a 
current fund of $1 million to $2 million.
Materials
ACTA (Militello & Hutton, 1998) is a practi-
tioner-focused metamethod of interest to 
applied psychologists working within the field 
of cognition (see Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 
2006, for discussion of the strengths and weak-
nesses of cognitive task analysis in relation to 
other knowledge elicitation methods, e.g., inter-
views, observation, process tracing, and con-
ceptual approaches). Used to elicit day traders’ 
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expertise in experience-based choice, ACTA is 
a set of knowledge elicitation and representa-
tion techniques intended to assist in identifying 
the key cognitive elements required to perform 
a task proficiently. The ACTA techniques were 
developed to complement each other, each tap-
ping into different aspects of cognitive skill.
The first technique, the task diagram, pro-
vides the interviewer with a broad overview of 
the task in question, summarized in three to six 
steps. With the task diagram, this stage allows 
the participant to identify the area that demands 
complex cognitive skills.
The second technique, the knowledge audit, 
focuses on the subtask identified in Stage 1 that 
presented significant cognitive difficulty. It 
allows the interviewer to review the aspects of 
expertise required for successful task comple-
tion using a set of eight probes (see Table 2). 
These probes are based on knowledge 
TABlE 2: Applied Cognitive Task Analysis Probes
Probe Description
1 Past and future: Experts know how the situation developed and know where the situation 
is going (de Groot, 1946/1978; Endsley, 1995; G. Klein & Crandall, 1995; G. Klein & 
Hoffman, 1993). Is there a time when you walked into the middle of a situation and 
knew exactly how things got there and where they were headed?
2 Big picture: Experts understand the whole situation and understand how elements fit 
together (Endsley, 1995; G. Klein, 1997). Can you give me an example of the big 
picture for this task? What are the major elements you have to know and keep track of?
3 Noticing: Experts can detect cues and see meaningful patterns (de Groot, 1946/1978; 
G. Klein & Hoffman, 1993; Shanteau, 1985). Have you had experiences where part of a 
situation just “popped” out at you, where you noticed things going on that others did 
not catch? What is an example?
4 Tricks of the trade: Experts can combine procedures and do not waste time and 
resources (G. Klein & Hoffman, 1993). When you do this task, are there ways of working 
smart or accomplishing more with less—i.e., tricks of the trade—that you have found 
particularly useful?
5 Improvising/opportunities: Experts can see beyond standard operating procedures and 
take advantage of opportunities (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Shanteau, 1985). Can you 
think of an example when you have improvised in this task or noticed an opportunity to 
do something better?
6 Self-monitoring: Experts are aware of their own performance and notice when 
performance is not what it should be and adjust to get the job done (Cohen, Freeman, 
& Wolf, 1996; Glaser & Chi, 1988). Can you think of a time when you realized that you 
would need to change the way you were performing in order to get a job done?
7 Anomalies: Experts can spot the unusual and detect deviations from the norm (G. Klein, 
1989, 1997; G. Klein & Hoffman, 1993). Can you describe an instance where you 
spotted a deviation from the norm or knew something was amiss?
8 Equipment difficulties: Experts know equipment can mislead and do not implicitly trust 
equipment as novices might (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993). Have there 
been times when the equipment pointed in one direction, but your own judgment told 
you to do something else? Or when you had to rely on experience to avoid being led 
astray by the equipment?
Source. Adapted from “Applied Cognitive Task Analysis: A Practitioner’s Toolkit for Understanding Cognitive Task 
Demands,” by L.G. Militello and R. J. B. Hutton, 1998, ergonomics, 41(11), p. 1622. Copyright 1998 by Taylor & 
Francis (www.tandfonline.com). Adapted with permission.
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categories that characterize expertise (Militello 
& Hutton, 1998): diagnosing and predicting, 
situation awareness, perceptual skills, develop-
ing and knowing when to apply tricks of the 
trade, improvising, metacognition, recognizing 
anomalies, and compensating for equipment 
limitations. As aspects of expertise are elicited, 
they are probed for further detail and concrete 
examples (e.g., In this situation, how would you 
know this? What cues and strategies are you 
relying on?). It is this ability to probe a variety 
of knowledge types (e.g., perceptual skills, 
mental models, metacognition, declarative 
knowledge, analogues and typicality, and 
anomalies; G. Klein & Militello, 2005), that 
provides a more complete description of cogni-
tive processes and sets the knowledge audit 
aside from structured interview and task analy-
sis techniques.
A key difference between the knowledge 
audit and standard forms of mental model 
assessment is that the knowledge audit draws 
directly from the research literature on expert–
novice differences (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; 
Hoffman, 1992; G. Klein & Hoffman, 1993; 
Shanteau, 1985) and critical decision method 
studies of expert decision making (Kaempf, 
Klein, Thordsen, & Wolf, 1996; G. Klein et al., 
1989). This encourages participants to identify 
why elements of the task may present a prob-
lem to inexperienced individuals (e.g., In what 
ways would this be difficult for a less-experi-
enced person? What makes it hard to do?), 
emphasizing the applied utility of this method.
The knowledge audit has been developed to 
capture key aspects of expertise, improving and 
streamlining data collection and analysis. It 
allows the interviewer to explore and probe 
issues such as situation assessment, potential 
errors, and how a novice would respond to the 
same situation, shedding light on the content 
and structure of knowledge. Whereas experi-
ence-based choice research has employed ver-
bal and nonverbal assessment probes leading to 
inferences about the forms of data underlying 
mental representations (see Camilleri & New-
ell, 2009a), ACTA is an entirely verbal method. 
The open-endedness of ACTA’s probes permits 
participants to respond using probabilistic terms 
or nonverbal numerical representation systems, 
crucial for studying cognition as it occurs in the 
wild.
An optional third stage, the simulation inter-
view, allows the interviewer to better under-
stand participants’ cognitive processes within 
the context of a challenging scenario. This can 
be useful in highlighting differences in expert–
novice perspectives and in developing training 
and system design recommendations.
Finally, a cognitive demands table merges and 
synthesizes data from all participants across the 
stages. This is intended for practitioner use to 
focus the analysis and identify common themes 
in the data. See Militello and Hutton (1998), 
Crandall et al. (2006), or the ACTA multimedia 
instructional CD (Militello, Hutton, & Miller, 
1997) used in preparation for these interviews 
for a more detailed review of this approach. 
Some of the limitations associated with ACTA 
are highlighted in our discussion. As a method, 
however, it offers promise, providing provoca-
tive insight into human cognitive processes.
Researchers have successfully used ACTA in 
empirical work to understand expertise in a 
diverse range of areas, including weather fore-
casting (Hoffman, 1992, 2006; Hoffman & 
Militello, 2008; Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton, & 
Klein, 1995; Hoffman, Trafton, & Roeber, 
2006), clinical nursing (Militello & Lim, 1995), 
firefighting (G. Klein et al., 1989), recruitment 
(Gore & Riley, 2004; Gore & McAndrew, 
2009), and military command-and-control oper-
ations (Drury & Darling, 2008). ACTA has 
provided a significant development in available 
tools and techniques for the identification of 
training needs in knowledge-based work, pro-
viding instructional designers with clearer 
guidelines when designing training for cogni-
tively demanding tasks in domain specific areas.
Reliability and validity. With no established 
metrics, cognitive task analysis methods have 
been open to critique on the grounds of reliabil-
ity, validity, and falsification. With arguably 
appropriate standards for one model of science 
only (one in which scientific inquiry prevails), 
this work is aligned with the perspective that 
there exists “particular ways of warranting 
validity claims rather than as universal, abso-
lute, guarantors of truth” (Mishler, 1990, p. 420). 
This more pluralistic interpretation of validity 
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has been considered appropriate for NDM (Lip-
shitz et al., 2001). Mishler (1990) suggests that 
inquiry-led research (such as NDM) ought to be 
evaluated using the criteria of credibility and 
transferability. Credibility is defined as the 
degree to which the study’s findings and conclu-
sions are warranted, and transferability as the 
extent of case-to-case translation.
Recognizing Kaplan’s (1964) proposition 
that research methods should drive the selection 
of evaluation criteria, Militello and Hutton 
(1998) have attempted to establish the reliabil-
ity and validity of ACTA using alternative indi-
cators. Questions of validity included the fol-
lowing: Does the information gathered address 
cognitive issues? Does the information gath-
ered deal with experience-based knowledge as 
opposed to classroom-based knowledge? Do 
the instructional materials generated contain 
accurate information that is important for nov-
ices to learn? Reliability was ascertained by 
determining whether ACTA was able to consis-
tently generate relevant cognitive information 
across participants. Findings indicated high 
levels of validity and reliability, with modal 
statistics occurring in the range of 90% to 95%. 
This is in line with interrater reliability statistics 
for this study, which were in the range of 78% 
to 85% for the task diagrams, knowledge 
audits, and cognitive demands table.
Procedure
Each interview lasted approximately 2 hr. 
The interviews opened with a discussion of the 
types of financial instruments and assets traded. 
When familiar with the domains of expertise, 
we completed Stages 1 and 2 of ACTA. During 
Stage 1, each participant was asked to outline a 
broad overview of his chosen task and to iden-
tify the most cognitively demanding element. 
Stage 2 required the researcher to ask a series of 
questions using the eight probes, recording 
notes in a knowledge audit table. Following 
data collection, each interview was transcribed. 
Transcripts were used to ensure technical accu-
racy of the knowledge audits. The average 
transcript was 12,653 words in length, more 
than 100,000 words in total.
The knowledge audits were then merged to 
produce a cognitive demands table representing 
the key elements deemed to be cognitively 
complex. Each of the eight aspects of expertise 
composing the knowledge audit was considered 
in turn. For instance, we integrated participants’ 
responses to the past and future aspect of exper-
tise consecutively, each time clustering com-
mon knowledge together and forming new 
themes of previously untapped knowledge. 
This process continued until the eight aspects of 
expertise had been populated with information 
from each knowledge audit. What resulted was 
a clustering of the key cognitive demand(s) for 
each aspect of expertise, added to the growing 
repository of the cognitive demands table on 
the basis of salience and frequency. This pro-
cess of synthesizing and arranging the data 
thematically was important in ensuring repre-
sentativeness across the 8 participants.
rEsults
Because of the wealth of qualitative data 
generated, an illustrative example is used to 
outline the results derived from Stages 1 and 2 
of ACTA. For Stage 2, the knowledge audit, 
results are presented with a number of extracts 
to provide a sense of the data elicited. We then 
provide a summary of the cognitive demands 
identified across our sample as a whole. The 
cognitive demands are organized according to 
prospect theory’s fourfold pattern of choice and 
are used to illustrate the nature of preferences in 
experience-based choice as studied in the wild.
Illustrative Example: day trader 
A (Foreign Exchange [FX] and 
Bullion trader, london)
Background demographics. Day Trader A is 
25 years old and holds 7 years of experience 
within the investment industry.
Stage 1: Task diagram. The task diagram for 
Day Trader A focuses on “FX spot transactions” 
(see Figure 1). Spot transactions involve the 
agreement to buy and sell at the present market 
value and to settle the transaction a few days 
later. The four broad decision components 
underpinning the execution of FX spot transac-
tions are considered in turn:
The first component involves establishing 
what currency pair is going to form the basis of 
the trade. This stage is often informed by day 
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traders’ attention to news releases and their 
assessment of its likely impact on foreign cur-
rencies. Directing attention toward the most 
liquid and widely traded currency pairs oper-
ates as a lens through which to filter incoming 
news releases, enabling rapid decision making.
The second stage of the task diagram 
involves decisions related to currency pair per-
formance, that is, which currency is going to 
perform or not perform. By focusing on one 
particular currency pair, the field of choice is 
significantly narrowed, constraining the cues 
attended to.
The third broad stage entails decisions 
regarding the size of the trade and level at 
which the market will be entered. For instance, 
this may involve the identification of a level 
(support or resistance) that if broken, a given 
security is bought (pullback) or the identifica-
tion of a dip in the market as an opportunity to 
buy. As the domain of choice narrows, decision 
making becomes increasingly associated with 
the logistics of placing a trade. However, the 
decision process underpinning this twofold 
choice is the most technically demanding.
For Day Trader A, technical analysis was 
noted to often drive this stage through consider-
ation of support and resistance levels on chart 
points. One mechanism used to identify levels 
was Fibonacci retracements. Fibonacci retrace-
ments assume that any given security will 
retrace a percentage of the previous move 
before reversing.
The final stage of the task diagram involves 
the selection of levels from which a given posi-
tion is exited (commonly referred to as trade 
management). This is integral both for instances 
where profit has been maximized and capital 
needs to be locked in, thus controlling profit 
risk, and for instances whereby a position is 
losing money and needs to be stopped out to 
maintain a positive profit and loss statement.
Complex component. The third stage, that is, 
size of the trade and entry levels, was identified as 
the most cognitively complex component within 
Day Trader A’s task diagram and formed the focus 
for the rest of the interview. This was similar to 
other traders’ task diagrams, although in addition 
to the size of the trade and entry levels, exit levels 
were also noted to be cognitively complex.
Stage 2: Knowledge audit. Table 3 provides 
an extract from Day Trader A’s knowledge 
audit. The two illustrative examples presented 
here are discussed in more detail below.
Big picture. The “big-picture” element of 
expertise is useful in describing the broad-level 
framework traders use to construct their view of 
FX markets and the actions they take. Four 
components were found to frame what Day 
Trader A attends to (again, this was very similar 
to other traders):
In trading FX markets, the dominant focus 
was noted to be movements in the major and 
minor currencies. Staying cognizant of world-
wide currency movements both enables and 
acts as a filter to other aspects, such as funda-
mental and technical analyses.
The second aspect composing the big picture 
is fundamental analysis. This involves tracking 
the fundamentals behind the currency driving 
the market at a given moment in time. As Day 
Trader A elaborated, understanding the strength 
of the economy is informed by a number of 
standardized parameters, including GDP.
The third component of the big picture 
relates to the use of technical analysis, that is, 
forecasting the future direction of markets 
through the study of past market data. Ignoring 
the actual nature of the market, technical analy-
sis employs models and trading rules based on 
What currency
perform / not
perform?
Exit levels*Size of trade* Level of market
What currency
pair look at?
- - - - Area of cognitive challenge
Figure 1. Illustrative example of a task diagram of “FX spot transactions” (Day Trader A).
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price and volume identified by market cycles 
and recognition of chart patterns. As Day 
Trader A explained, understanding past market 
performance and levels of resistance within the 
market, entry and exit levels can be identified. 
It appeared that in general, choice of charting 
methods and trading approach, such as the 
placement of resting orders in the market, 
reflects the degree of individual preference in 
experience-based choice.
The final aspect of the big picture, relates to 
traders’ need to remain cognizant of desk and 
individual targets. As can be seen in Table 3, 
Day Trader A notes the need to play the “per-
centage game,” that is, limit risks and run prof-
its. Providing a description of the overall pref-
erences and constraints framing day traders’ 
thinking, the next example taken from the 
knowledge audit demonstrates these in action.
Noticing. This aspect of expertise focused on 
the detection of market movements in minor 
currency pairs, with the collapse of the Thai baht 
(THB) and significant price move of the New 
Zealand dollar (NZD) as examples. Monitoring 
the market activity of major and minor currency 
pairs, Day Trader A suggested that in his experi-
ence, large, rapid movements are usually driven 
by data releases. Data releases might include the 
release of monetary policy statements expecting 
the NZD to weaken in New Zealand or shock 
wave–type releases, such as a bomb explosion. 
Known as “news trading,” rapid price move-
ments require the immediate placement of a 
position. As Day Trader A warns, the source of 
movement should not be located until after a bid 
has been placed, or the opportunity will be lost. 
This example, alongside cognition elicited from 
other traders using the noticing prompt, illus-
trates how incoming data sources can instanta-
neously direct day traders’ attention to a 
particular currency, thereby constraining deci-
sion choice. Underscored by a preference for 
maximizing profit, the knowledge audit captures 
the importance of experience-based choice in 
knowing to immediately place a position.
cognitive demands
A cognitive demands table was compiled that 
synthesized data drawn across the eight knowl-
edge audits from the day traders. The objective 
TABlE 3: Illustrative Example 1: First Section of Knowledge Audit (Day Trader A)
Big Picture. . .
Major/minor currency pair 
movements
Market fundamentals
Technical analysis
Individual and desk targets
Consider context; market 
expectations and trader 
interpretations will direct 
(and possibly delay) price 
movement
Play the percentage game
Resting orders/exploit overnight 
currency movements, e.g., 
If-Done/Market-If-Touched
Novices may find it difficult to 
look behind the fundamentals
Novices may struggle to 
anticipate how data releases will 
affect the market and how the 
market will react to certain data 
reports
Noticing. . .
Detecting market movements in 
minor currency pairs, such as 
collapse of Thai baht (THB) or 
significant price move of New 
Zealand dollar (NZD)
Market activity of major/minor 
currency pairs
Large/rapid movements usually 
driven by data releases: 
Release of monetary policy 
statement expecting NZD to 
weaken or shock wave–type 
releases, e.g., bomb explosion
Uncertainty of cause and duration 
makes size of trade and entry/
exit levels difficult to execute
Temptation to determine cause 
as opposed to immediate 
execution
 The trend is your friend; 
immediately place position
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of this stage of ACTA is to provide a generic 
overview of (a) the difficult cognitive elements, 
(b) why it is difficult for a novice, (c) errors a 
novice might commonly make, and (d) cues and 
strategies that experienced day traders use to 
overcome cognitively difficult elements. Over-
all, six common elements of expertise that exhib-
ited significant cognitive demands for the day 
traders interviewed were extracted (see Table 4).
Each cognitive element listed represents a 
single scenario day traders might encounter. 
Note that although these tend to exist singu-
larly, they may also occur in combination with 
other difficult cognitive elements; for example, 
detecting regime shifts might occur alongside 
anticipating effect of change in market funda-
mentals. Arranging cognitive activity in this 
way, the cognitive demands table provides a 
variety of real-world examples of preferences 
across the spectrum of medium-, large-, and 
small-probability gains and losses.
Combining prospect theory and cognitive 
demands. Organized according to prospect the-
ory’s fourfold pattern of choice, the cognitive 
demands included in Table 4 are now presented 
alongside their implications for understanding 
preferences in experience-based choice.
Medium- and large-probability gains. Iden-
tifying emerging trends and arbitrage opportu-
nities are two cognitive demands that reveal day 
traders to exhibit a risk-seeking preference for 
medium- and large-probability gains.
Identifying emerging trends. This example 
represents a basic trading methodology 
where risks are limited and profits run, 
articulated as playing the percentage 
game. The identification of emerging 
trends relies on a number of indicators, 
such as technical analysis and Fibonnaci 
retracements, that assist in the detec-
tion of entry points into a rising or fall-
ing market. Accordingly, these cues and 
strategies are used to optimize the condi-
tions that are risk seeking for gains with 
medium and large probabilities.
Arbitrage opportunities. This type of execu-
tion is similarly risk seeking for gains, 
with an acceptance of the risks where the 
potential gain is a much higher probability. 
Exploiting price discrepancies between 
errors in bid and offer prices represents a 
“free trade,” with zero risk for acquiring a 
large probability gain.
Small-probability losses. The cognitive demand 
of responding to trend reversals illustrates how 
scenarios evolve in which traders are risk averse 
to small-probability large losses.
Responding to trend reversals. One of the 
cognitively challenging elements of 
decision making within this domain is 
responding to a change in market condi-
tions after a position has been placed. A 
common error can stem from the naive 
belief that the reverse trend is only 
momentary, instead of immediately clos-
ing the position to minimize losses. If one 
ignores the stop loss in the hope that the 
market will change direction and lead to 
a profit, there is a small probability that 
this will produce a large loss and close the 
account. Traders are therefore risk averse 
to the small probability of a large loss.
Small-probability gains. The cognitive demands 
table also indicates choice behavior for gains 
with small probabilities to be risk averse. There 
are two specific instances, detecting regime 
shifts and anticipating effect of change in mar-
ket fundamentals, that illustrate how this might 
occur.
Detecting regime shifts. One of the common 
errors day traders encounter is errone-
ous interpretation of price movement. 
This coupled with the desire to adopt a 
position on emergent trends before other 
market players so as to maximize poten-
tial gains might, for those with less expe-
rience, induce a risk-averse preference 
for small-probability gains.
Anticipating effect of change in market fun-
damentals. This difficult cognitive ele-
ment is integral to the detection of regime 
shifts, and so in a similar vein to the above 
example, day traders exhibit risk-averse 
preferences for small-probability gains. 
Common errors can include errors in 
extrapolation and thereby basing hypoth-
eses on small-probability scenarios.
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TABlE 4: Cognitive Demands Table
Difficult Cognitive 
Element Why Difficult? Common Errors Cues and Strategies Used
1. Identifying 
emerging 
trends, such as 
bull markets and 
rallies
Market rumor vs. real 
trend; dips do not 
always indicate rallies; 
uncertainty makes it 
difficult to pick entry/
exit levels; requires 
technical analysis and 
intuition to anticipate 
market correction 
levels
Confusion of rally 
with reaction highs 
(Fibonnaci does not 
work on reaction 
highs); erroneously 
placed trend line; 
booking a trend 
(picking a top); 
interfere with position; 
establish cause of 
trend as opposed to 
placing trade
Technical analysis 
(channel of higher 
highs/higher lows 
and daily highs/lows); 
anticipate market 
correction (Elliot 
waves); percentage 
game; enter on pull-
backs; let trend work 
position (the trend is 
your friend)
2. Responding to 
trend reversals, 
i.e., collapsing 
market or trend 
moving against 
short position
Reaction moves are 
quicker than grinds 
with the trend; may be 
a false signal; difficult 
deciding between 
courses of action; 
textbooks caution 
against doubling up 
strategy
May not react quickly 
to downside trend; 
naively hopeful 
scenario will reverse 
instead of cutting 
losses; expectation for 
dip to bounce when it 
is a collapse
Bullish/bearish signals 
(candlestick charts, 
i.e., filled bars vs. clear 
bars); percentage 
game; close position 
and lose value vs. turn 
position and go long; 
double up to improve 
price average and exit 
chance
3. Detecting 
regime shifts
Difficult to identify cause 
of price anomaly/
movement as a regime 
shift; may not notice 
new variables at play; 
difficult to integrate 
changes in market 
fundamentals to create 
a coherent story
Erroneous interpretation 
of price movement 
as a cyclic iteration in 
the theory of mean 
reversion; assume 
emerging new 
paradigm to be normal 
business
Use changes in market 
fundamentals to 
interpret price 
anomalies (prices are 
a lagging indicator of 
fundamental change); 
take position on 
emergent trend before 
other market players
4. Taking action 
following 
sudden 
interruption to 
supply
Rare event; uncertainty 
of long-term impact; 
lack of mechanical 
knowledge to interpret 
reports of malfunction 
and potential effects; 
tightness of U.K. 
supply/demand; lack of 
“insider” information
Panic due to nature of 
stressful situation and 
either “do nothing,” 
mitigating loss, or 
“overreact” and close 
out all positions; 
attempt to understand 
current position as 
opposed to future 
action
Analysis of U.K. storage 
levels; ascertain extent 
of interruption and 
market sentiment; 
cover short positions 
to minimize losses; 
scenario generation: 
future market action 
and relative value of 
contracts
(continued)
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Medium- and large-probability losses. The 
cognitive demands table also illustrates the case 
of risk-averse preferences for medium- and 
high-probability losses. Taking action following 
sudden interruption to supply is a case in kind.
Taking action following sudden interruption 
to supply. In the event of sudden inter-
ruption to supply and a collapsing mar-
ket, risk-averse preferences can lead one 
to “overreact” and close out all positions 
or to take no action, which mitigates the 
loss. Promptly covering short positions 
(buying back the same type and number 
of securities previously sold) can assist 
in the minimization of losses.
These results suggest the fourfold pattern of 
preferences of experience-based choice when 
studied in the wild to be risk seeking for 
medium- and high-probability gains, risk averse 
for small-probability gains and losses, and risk 
averse for medium- and high-probability losses 
(see Table 5).
dIscussIon
Documenting a field study of expertise using 
a detailed cognitive task analysis, this study 
crucially begins to reveal the origins and con-
tents of day traders’ preferences and how these 
constrain and enable experience-driven action. 
Our research suggests that there is value in 
adopting a naturalistic approach and under-
scores the timeliness of Hertwig and Erev’s 
(2009) suggestion to take the study of experi-
ence-based choice “into the wild.”
This study makes a distinct contribution 
toward Rakow and Newell’s (2010) call to better 
understand the properties of the internal represen-
tation of payoffs. Reviewing examples that sit at 
the intersection of description and experience, 
this research illustrates how day traders construct 
their understanding of gains relative to losses and 
emphasizes the relevance of prospect theory for 
Difficult Cognitive 
Element Why Difficult? Common Errors Cues and Strategies Used
5. Exploiting price 
anomalies in 
markets, such 
as arbitrage 
opportunities
Anomaly may appear 
briefly (may miss spike 
in candle chart); may 
not want to execute 
arbitrage deals; 
difficult to infer motive 
of bank/producers 
from bids and offers
Too slow to take 
advantage of price 
mismatch; alert other 
day traders to price 
anomaly instead of 
taking action; lack 
knowledge of where 
real market is and 
not notice the bank/
producers bidding the 
price
Spotting errors in 
spreads across 
bank platforms 
(discrepancies between 
bid and offer prices 
= free trade); low 
hanging fruit (exploit 
opportunity by trading 
between platforms)
6. Anticipating 
effect of change 
in market 
fundamentals
Lack understanding 
of how changes in 
infrastructure would 
affect future market 
movements; difficulty 
anticipating effect 
of data releases on 
market and market 
reactions
Failure to consider the 
bigger picture following 
a release of figures; not 
appreciating choppiness 
is due to market players’ 
mixed views; errors 
in extrapolations, i.e., 
basing hypotheses 
on small-probability 
scenarios
Monitor affect on other 
market fundamentals and 
price; base strategy on 
extrapolations of today’s 
action to a forward date; 
be proactive by leaving 
resting orders in market, 
i.e., If-Done and Market-
If-Touched
TABlE 4: (continued)
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understanding how attitudes toward risk concern-
ing gains and losses deviate from studies of 
description and experience-based choice in the 
laboratory when studied in the wild.
We start by making reference to the notion of 
the percentage game—one where risks are lim-
ited and profits run—as a basic trading method-
ology. Risk seeking for gains with medium and 
large probabilities, traders understand that 
across a period of time, probabilities will weigh 
in their favor (gains × probability > losses × 
probability). See lower left quadrant of Table 5.
Arbitrage opportunities are similarly risk 
seeking for gains, with an acceptance of the 
risks where the potential gain is a much higher 
probability. Note that arbitrage is analogous to 
the sure bet of $1 from described choice. This 
is an interesting finding both because patterns 
of choice for medium and large probabilities is 
underresearched and because it sits antitheti-
cally with the speculative proposition that in 
decisions from experience, participants show 
risk aversion for medium- and large-probability 
gains (Rakow & Newell, 2010).
Theoretically, one would assume traders to be 
unequivocally risk seeking in the domain of 
gains. However, our findings suggest choice 
behavior for gains with small probabilities to be 
risk averse (see upper left quadrant in Table 5). 
Detecting regime shifts and anticipating effect of 
change in market fundamentals illustrate how 
preferences for small-probability gains can mani-
fest as scenarios evolve. The explanation accom-
panying the cognitively complex element of Day 
Trader A’s task diagram supports this finding, 
drawing attention to the role of organizational 
constraints, such as daily stop losses and the per-
centage game, in avoiding account drawdown. 
Strategies of this type are uncommon within the 
domain of trading, a finding more likely to be 
found in the wild as opposed to conditions of 
descriptive choice within the laboratory. Our 
work does, however, concur with findings pro-
posing that for small probabilities, participants 
are risk averse both for experience-based prob-
lems examined in the laboratory and in the wild.
On the note of small-probability events, the 
findings outlined within this article also suggest 
traders to be risk averse to the small probability 
of a large loss (see upper right quadrant in Table 
5). The cognitive demand of responding to 
trend reversals illustrates how the purpose of 
stop losses is to close a trade at a predetermined 
level so that large losses are not incurred. Risk 
aversion for small-probability losses echoes the 
findings within the paradigm of description but 
not experience-based choice in the laboratory.
Knowledge gained through this study also 
leads one to speculate about choice behavior in 
the conditions of medium- and large-probabil-
ity losses (see lower right quadrant in Table 5). 
The example of taking action following sudden 
interruption to supply illustrates how sudden 
changes can induce preferences for risk-averse 
action, for example, covering short positions to 
minimize losses. We wonder whether within 
this domain, choice following successive losses 
might also illustrate this type of preference? We 
note Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) proposi-
tion that “a person who has not made peace 
with his losses is likely to accept gambles that 
would be unacceptable to him otherwise” (p. 
287) as justification of this hypothesis.
As a whole, this work opposes the sugges-
tion that “there is little evidence of a difference 
in patterns of choice under description and 
experience when the probabilities are moderate 
to large” (Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004, p.10). 
In fact, whereas Rakow and Newell (2010) 
hypothesized risk-averse choices for medium- 
and large-probability gains and risk-seeking 
choices for medium- and large-probability 
losses within the decisions-from-experience 
paradigm, this study suggests the converse. 
TABlE 5: The Fourfold Pattern for Decisions Studied “in the Wild”
“Cognition in the Wild”
Probability Gains Losses
Small probabilities Risk aversion Risk aversion
Medium and large probabilities Risk seeking Risk aversion
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This insight is crucial where patterns of choice 
for medium and large probabilities remain 
underresearched and supports our hypothesis 
that field studies following an experience-based 
paradigm might reveal effects that meaning-
fully differ from both description-based and 
experience-based laboratory research.
Shifting preferences between these two for-
mats of choice and decision making as studied 
in the wild underscore the asymmetry of human 
choice. In accounting for the differences in 
preference, we consider whether, for decisions 
from experience, there exist a number of sub-
types. The first takes the form of experience 
through learning, whereby repeated exposure 
to the processes molds the responses. This is of 
the type studied with the lens of experience-
based choice. The second, experience through 
professional training, is one whereby organiza-
tions set the fourfold pattern of responses, and 
experience simply sets out to achieve them. 
This experience type distorts the fourfold pat-
tern exhibited within description and experi-
ence formats of choice seen in Table 1. For 
instance, although we might expect to see risk-
seeking preferences for small-probability gains 
(we generally expect traders to be risk seeking 
for gains, risk averse for losses), experience 
through professional training overrides this. 
This insight holds consequences for the design 
of instructional training for novices.
The implications of the conceptualizations 
of experience through learning and experience 
through professional training might also extend 
to other complex sociotechnical systems, such 
as aviation and the military—domains in which, 
on the basis of this research, one would expect 
expert performance to be similarly risk averse, 
with the exception of risk-seeking behaviors for 
medium- and large-probability gains. The 
impact of these findings hold potential to trans-
fer beyond the domain of study in this article 
and are worthy of detailed exploration within 
the NDM community.
Other decision-making perspectives might 
also take value from these findings. Calling 
attention to the value of context is an approach 
that moves beyond behavioral finance approaches 
(Anderson & Sunder, 1995; Staël von Holstein, 
1972) and begins to build a more complete pic-
ture of how context, training, and socialization 
interweave to facilitate understanding of risk 
propensity. This is an important advancement 
that sits alongside the work of Fenton-O’Creevy 
et al. (2005). Future examinations of risk pro-
pensity might benefit further from emerging 
discussions of naturalistic studies of insight and 
intuition in field settings (Gore & Sadler-Smith, 
2011; G. Klein & Jarosz, 2011).
This work also holds implications for ACTA, 
a method that has been endorsed as a useful 
addition to the instructional design practitio-
ners’ toolkit. Providing a significant extension 
to studies employing the ACTA techniques, this 
study also illustrates its relevance for inductive-
theory building.
limitations
This research has some important limita-
tions. First, although we have located our work 
within the theoretical framework of NDM (G. 
Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 
1993; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2001; Zsambok & 
Klein, 1997) and experienced-based choice, we 
recognize that despite two decades of empirical 
inquiry, NDM still requires further rigorous 
testing and theoretical development if the study 
of expertise in applied settings is to progress.
Second, as in all research conducted in the 
wild, participants subscribe to norms of organi-
zational behavior and to common narratives 
about the nature of their domain expertise. It 
has been proposed that “NDM research needs 
to pay more attention to three things in relation 
to organizations: constraints imposed by con-
text; distributed information; and differentials 
in power and vested interests” (Gore et al., 
2006, p. 936). The degree to which these guide 
the evolution of preferences in experience-
based choice lies outside the remit of the cur-
rent research but warrants further study. In 
addition, it would be interesting to note what 
further value a cultural lens might bring to in-
the-wild studies (H. Klein, 2004).
The third limitation questions the degree to 
which the fourfold pattern of choice exhibited 
by day traders extends to other domains when 
studied in the wild. This issue of generalizabil-
ity also leads one to question the validity of the 
notion of experience through professional train-
ing as an explanatory account of the differences 
between experience-based choice as studied 
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within the laboratory and in the wild. Although 
we acknowledge generalizability to be a sig-
nificant shortcoming of qualitative research, we 
attest to the value of studying cognition in the 
wild as a means of identifying new possibilities 
for future research.
The fourth limitation is methodological, 
directly relating to the design of research con-
ducted outside of the laboratory. We recognize 
the relentless work of applied researchers to 
resolve the dilemma of both gathering rich quali-
tative data with techniques such as ACTA and 
reconciling issues surrounding validity, reliabil-
ity, the presentation of data to enact meaning, and 
the importance of replicable data analysis for 
future research. We are also aware of the diffi-
culty of comparing findings from studies of cog-
nition in the wild with those from description and 
experience-based choice within the laboratory, 
and we acknowledge that this opens the possibil-
ity that our findings are a function of method. 
Future work might rectify these shortcomings by 
focusing attention on the development of quasiex-
perimental approaches to accessing cognition in 
applied settings. ACTA provides a theoretically 
grounded foundation for the development of 
instructional content for this objective.
Future research
Despite the limitations of these data, this 
work provides the opportunity for others to test 
the conjectures brought forth by this field study. 
Using this article and the insights it has gener-
ated as a foundation, we have developed a num-
ber of testable questions to guide future research.
Does the four-fold pattern of choice exhib-
ited by day traders in the wild extend 
to other domains? Overcoming the lim-
its of generalizability, what can the study 
of other domains reveal about the nature 
of preferences when studied in situ?
What can we learn from the conceptual-
ization of experience through profes-
sional training? Future research should 
seek to identify further domains that sup-
port or contest this hypothesis. How do 
domains supporting the proposition of 
experience through professional training 
skew the properties of the internal repre-
sentation of payoffs?
How does the study of experience through 
learning in the wild translate to the four-
fold choice of experience in the labora-
tory? Understanding choice behavior in 
the wild when manifest in the condition 
of experience through learning is crucial 
for elucidating the parameters that guide 
preference.
conclusIon
This article demonstrates the value in taking 
the examination of experience-based choice into 
the wild. Our approach has started to illuminate 
the origins and contents of day traders’ domain 
preferences and how these constrain experience-
driven action. This naturalistic examination 
emphasizes the relevance of prospect theory for 
understanding the internal representation of 
payoffs and the asymmetry of human choice: 
Preferences concerning gains and losses as stud-
ied with the lens of cognition in the wild differ 
from the fourfold pattern of preferences exhib-
ited by experience-based choice when studied in 
the laboratory. Accounting for these differences, 
we conclude with the proposition that when 
studying cognition in the wild, one ought to 
make the distinction between the study of expe-
rience through learning and experience through 
professional training. We anticipate this research 
to pose a challenging and innovative starting 
point from which future collaborations across 
the decision sciences can develop.
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